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Legal citation provides the foundation for a legal argument
and helps form the overall "look and feel" of the brief
containing that argument.' This article suggests that writers can
improve their use of the specialized language of citation by
recalling Aristotle's classical rules for effective advocacy.'
Under his framework, an effective work of advocacy employs
logos, ethos, and pathos. Logos is the persuasive force of the
reasoning and facts, ethos is the personal credibility of the
advocate, and pathos is the emotional appeal of the argument.3
This article briefly surveys each of these classic principles in the
specific context of legal citation. It concludes that while logos is
the traditional focus for selecting citations, the concepts of ethos
and pathos, too often overlooked, deserve attention, as their use
may dramatically enhance a brief s persuasiveness.
* David S. Coale is a partner in Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal L.L.P. in
Dallas, Texas. He thanks Luke Madole for his insights about advocacy, and Charlene Bond
for her able editorial assistance.
1. See generally Ursula Weigold, A New Approach to Legal Citation Form, 13
Appellate Advocate 17 (Fall 2000) (The Appellate Advocate is the quarterly report of the
State Bar of Texas Appellate Section.) (copy on file with The Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).
2. The author is indebted to Herbert Stem's excellent application of these principles to
trial practice. See Herbert J. Stem, Trying Cases to Win ch. 4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
1991).
3. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse (George A. Kennedy trans.,
Oxford U. Press 1991). For a general overview of the roles of ethos and pathos, the
"nonrational means" of persuading legal audiences, see Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos &
Legal Audience, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 85 (1994).
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II. LOGOS, ETHOS, AND PATHOS
Logos-logic-is the most intuitively useful of the
Aristotelian principles in the context of citation selection. A
brief argues that a court should apply precedent in a certain way;
citation supports that argument by establishing what the
precedent is. Without citation, there is simply no traditional
legal argument.
Ample literature explains how to identify the precedent and
apply it to the facts of a case. Among the universe of pertinent
precedents, some are controlling while others are merely• 4
persuasive. Within an opinion that is a controlling precedent, a
statement "necessary" to the result is a binding "holding,"
while other statements not affecting the outcome are "dicta,"
which may persuade but do not control.5 The question of what is
"necessary" then turns on the definition of the facts of the
dispute before the court.6 Citation that follows these established
principles will likely satisfy the guideline of "logos."
Ethos-personal credibility-is not as obvious to readers of
a specific legal argument as is the logical structure of that
argument. Over the context of an entire brief, however,
4. See generally 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 150-60 (1990) (describing the precedential effect
of opinions issued by different tribunals).
5. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) ("When an opinion
issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary
to that result by which we are bound."); see also Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 490 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although technically dicta .... an important
part of the Court's rationale for the result that it reache[s] ... is entitled to greater
weight .... ); John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law 261-62 (1921)
("Judicial Precedent ... must be an opinion the formation of which is necessary for the
decision of a particular case; in other words it must not be obiter dictum."); see generally
Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy & Adjudication,
74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 655, 709-29 (1999) (summarizing ways to distinguish dicta from
holdings).
6. See generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 18-
19 n. 21 (1989) (summarizing a classic debate about the identification of "material facts").
Karl Llewellyn has artfully noted that a judge can adhere with "mandarin" strictness to the
distinction between holding and dicta, confirming a prior case so tightly to its facts that it
"holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars," or sweeping broadly to
any attractive language, to say that "[n]o matter how broad the statement, no matter how
unnecessary on the facts or the procedural issues, if that was the rule the court laid down,
then that the court has held." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 67-68 (Oceana
Publications 1951).
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credibility may be the most significant part of the advocate's
work, even if the reader never consciously focuses on it.'
The concept of pathos-emotional appeal-may at first
glance seem unrelated to the formalities of citation. Attention to
pathos in the citation context, however, allows an advocate to
develop an argument into more than a dry discussion of
holdings.8 The argument can then become more interesting and
ultimately more persuasive.'
The following examples illustrate the use of these concepts
in citation selection. They show that while the use of logically
correct citations can build credibility, an unnecessary credibility
issue can arise if logic is the sole focus. Similarly, citation that
may not contribute to the strict logic of an opinion can enhance
its credibility and overall appeal.'°
A. Seminal Cases
Advocates frequently cite seminal cases such as Erie" and
Celotex.'2 Some citations to these well-known cases may well be
7. See Douglas K. Norman, The Art of Selecting Cases to Cite, 63 Tex. B.J. 340, 341
(Apr. 2000); see generally Stern, supra n. 2, at 13 (defining the establishment of personal
credibility as "Rule One" of advocacy).
8. See Elizabeth Fajan & Mary R. Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United States v.
Dickerson: Role [Im]morality and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1, 21
(2000) ("Emotional appeal plays a role in the persuasive process because of the vital
impact it has on our intellectual convictions and our will to act.")
9. See Stem, supra n. 2, at 87 (noting the search, in the trial context, for ways "to
make the case bigger than its facts" ).
10. The same considerations affect citation form and placement. See ALl Citation
Format Committee, AALL Task Force on Citation Formats, Report of March 1, 1995, 87
L. Libr. J. 581 (1995), available at <http://www.aallnet.org/committee/citation/taskjforce.
html> (accessed Nov. 16, 2001) (advocating the development of "universal" citation
format, which retrieves sources without regard to the medium in which they appear); Paul
Axel-Lute, Legal Citation Form: Theory and Practice, 75 L. Libr. J. 148 (1982). Others
have theorized that citation placement-within the text or in footnotes-affects a reader's
reaction to forms of persuasive writing. Compare Bryan A. Garner, The Citational
Footnote, 13 Appellate Advocate 2 (Winter 2000) with Mark E. Steiner, Without
Precedent: Footnotes in Judicial Opinions, 12 Appellate Advocate 3 (Fall 2000) (copies on
file with The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
I1. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (establishing application of federal
common law in cases in which jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship).
12. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319-20 (1986) (describing the procedure for
a "no evidence" summary judgment against a party with the burden of proof on an issue).
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"makeweight" references.' 3 It is also true, however, that citation
to a well-known opinion shows that the author knows about the
history of the issue, and can thus enhance his credibility-or
ethos-as a knowledgeable advocate.
Citation to the "right" case or article can also, in the
appropriate context, help ground an argument in a tradition
larger than the case and enhance its pathos.'" For example, a
citation to Erie in a state law case in federal court serves little
purpose as a matter of logic, but it does serve to remind the
reader that the choice of state law to govern a dispute is a
serious matter that has received intense attention from the courts
over the years. The same is true of using a citation to Celotex,
which reminds the reader of the importance the Supreme
Court places on the summary judgment procedure.
B. Sound Bites
Lawyers often use two or more citations to support a
proposition. When well-chosen language from the second source
reinforces the point made by the first, the persuasive effect is
enhanced. The following example illustrates the appeal of a
well-phrased "sound bite." '" The second case improves the
overall force of the citation, even though its formal holding is
wholly redundant of the first:
See e.g. Azar v. Hayter, 874 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (N.D. Fla.
1995) ("Plaintiffs FDCPA claim has nothing to do with
whether the underlying debt is valid. An FDCPA claim
concerns the method of collecting the debt. It does not arise
out of the transaction creating the debt .... "), aff'd, 66
F.3d 342 (11 th Cir. 1995); accord Berrios v. Sprint Corp.,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6579, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
1998) ("All reported cases on the issue have found that a
defendant's counterclaims for payment of an overdue debt
13. See generally J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence
People, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 843, 861 (1996) (explaining the frequent citation of certain
law review articles with the principle: "Write icons, not articles.").
14. See Norman, supra n. 7, at 341.
15. Sound bite-" [A. brief recorded statement (as by a public figure) broadcast
especially on a television news program; also : a brief catchy comment suitable for use as a
sound bite." Merriam Webster Online, Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
<http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary> (accessed Nov. 20, 2001).
CLASSICAL CITATION
are distinct from, and not logically related to, a plaintiff's
FDCPA claim based on improper debt collection
practices." ).16
By emphasizing the fact that "[a]ll reported cases" reach
the same conclusion, the writer gives that conclusion greater
weight and emphasis (pathos), since it suggests that a significant
number of courts have both considered the issue and taken the
time to write a published opinion about it. The writer's
conclusion also seems more credible (ethos) because of the
unanimity of the opinions that have considered the issue, even
though as a matter of strict logic, that should not matter.' 7
In the same vein, compare the effect of a simple citation to
the holding of an ERISA benefits case with that of a citation
providing an additional comment by the court about the intended
force of that holding.
Example 1:
See Toulson v. Avondale Indus., 141 F.3d 604, 611 (5th Cir.
1998) (affirming an administrator's discretion to interpret
the phrase "mental and nervous condition" in an ERISA
plan).
Example 2:
See Toulson v. Avondale Indus., 141 F.3d 604, 611 (5th Cir.
1998) (affirming an administrator's discretion to interpret
the phrase "mental and nervous condition" in an ERISA
plan, and warning "that fomenting and prosecuting
16. The example uses an unpublished opinion as the source of the "sound bite."
Quoting an unpublished opinion may violate court rules in some jurisdictions, and the
practice may weaken the brief writer's credibility even in those jurisdictions that do not
prohibit such citations. Compare Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding
unconstitutional the Eighth Circuit's rule prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions),
vacated on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (former opinion vacated on
mootness grounds, leaving open the question of the rule's constitutionality) with Hart v.
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Ninth Circuit's no-citation rule
does not violate Constitution's Article III).
17. See e.g. Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the
Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1143, 1212 (1999) ("When many circuits consider an issue and all rule the same way, the
case for following their lead becomes very strong indeed."); but see generally Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Self Reliance, in Essays 51-52 (Riverside Press 1883) ("Whoso would be
a man must be a nonconformist.").
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litigation of this ilk ... could result in sanctions more
severe than mere assessment of costs").
The second statement, rather than just announcing a
holding, reveals that the holding is particularly significant and
should not be questioned lightly. Citing such a statement
reinforces the logical force and appeal of the citation because it
signals that the earlier court had particular confidence both in
the importance (pathos) and the correctness (ethos) of its
conclusion. Indeed, there is ample evidence that courts not only
quote their earlier statements along these lines, but that they
expect advocates to acknowledge the weight of such precedent,
even when none of it is from the controlling jurisdiction. 8
C. Overcitation
Overcitation is a temptation derived from the powerful
research software that makes massive amounts of case law
available.'9 If a brief provides too many citations, even if all of
18. See e.g. Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619, 626 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming
the dismissal of a due process claim arising from a forfeiture, observing that the Supreme
Court had earlier recognized "a long and unbroken line of cases" rejecting similar claims)
(quoting Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 444-45 (1996)); Smith v. Cromer, 159 F.3d
875, 879 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting an argument about a federal employee's obligation to
testify because of that court's previous recognition of "an unbroken of line of authority" to
the contrary) (quoting Boron Oil v. Downie, 873 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1989)); U.S. v. Hunt,
117 F.3d 1414, 1997 WL 381859, *2 (4th Cir. 1997) (table) (rejecting an argument about
the operation of a Sentencing Guideline, citing an earlier case rejecting the same argument
as one that "borders on the frivolous") (quoting U.S. v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th
Cir. 1990)).
One federal district court imposed Rule II sanctions on counsel who ignored such
non-mandatory authority, remarking:
[H]ad counsel conducted even the most fleeting review of Thirteenth
Amendment caselaw, he would have soon discovered an unbroken line of cases
to the contrary. Although this line of cases contains no controlling decisions by
the Court of Appeals for this circuit, the sheer volume of uniformly contrary
decisions from other courts, as well as dictum from leading Supreme Court
opinions, constituted more than adequate authority to put plaintiffs counsel on
notice that his Thirteenth Amendment assertions were not well grounded in law
and that sanctions would be in order unless counsel bolstered his assertions with
at least a modicum of argument for extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.
Matthew v. Freedman, 128 F.R.D. 194, 201-202 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (footnote omitted), aff'd,
919 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1990).
19. See Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in
the Information Age, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 405, 407 (1994); see generally Susan W. Brenner,
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them support the argument as a matter of pure logic, that brief
may divert the reader's attention to the amount of research rather
than the argument. It will then be harder for the reader to focus
on the key points. Compare these examples:
Example 1:
The defense of quasi-estoppel does not require proof of
detrimental reliance. See e.g. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Barner, 964 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1998, no pet.); 20 Atkinson Gas Co. v. Albrecht, 878 S.W.2d
236, 240 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied);
Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.-Austin
1994, no writ); New Braunfels Factory Outlet Ctr., Inc. v.
IHOP Realty Corp., 872 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1994, no writ); Vessels v. Anschutz Corp., 823
S.W.2d 762, 765-66 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ
denied); Steubner Realty 19, Ltd. v. Cravens Road 88, Ltd.,
817 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no writ); Arrington v. County of Dallas, 792 S.W.2d
468, 472 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Stimpson v.
Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, writ denied).
Example 2:
The defense of quasi-estoppel does not require proof of
detrimental reliance. See e.g. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Barner, 964 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
Precedent Inflation (Transaction Publishers 1992). Even in the days before computerized
research facilitated the finding of widely scattered authority, David Mellinkoff decried "the
law's bellowing redundancy" in searching for and citing multiple precedents for a
proposition of law:
In these ever more mountainous reports, lawyers continue to stalk the elusive
law, with a now traditional faith that he who hunts long enough will find the law
he wants. No matter that it lurks in some improbable cranny between law and
equity, in some remote and dozing jurisdiction, covered with cosmic or atomic
dust. Armed with Shepard's and a digest, the good lawyer will track down the
law, drag it out, and parade it in triumph as a hand-bagged precedent. So strong
is this faith that it fires counsel on opposite sides of most issues, and so rich is
the accumulation of precedent that usually the faith of each is justified.
David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law 374 (Little, Brown & Co. 1963).
20. The unusual citation form follows certain conventions peculiar to Texas. See Texas
Rules of Form 22-25 (Tex. L. Rev. Assn., eds., 8th ed., U. Tex. Austin Sch. L.
Publications, Inc. 1992).
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1998, no pet.) (" Misrepresentation by one party, and
reliance by the other, are not necessary elements of quasi-
estoppel."); Stimpson v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 743
S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied)
(" [T]he courts have developed the related concept of
'quasi-estoppel,' in which false representation and
detrimental reliance need not be shown.").
This example illustrates that it can be counterproductive to
simply amass citations on an issue, even if they are logically
relevant. By piling citation upon citation, the advocate risks
reducing his credibility by appearing to be citing cases without
truly having mastery of their holdings. And the emotional appeal
of a crisp quotation is reduced by surrounding it with an
excessive number of symbols and page numbers.
D. Policy
Just as citation to a leading article enhances an advocate's
credibility, citation that describes the policies or the broader
principles behind a legal rule can enliven a logically sound but
otherwise dull discussion of that rule. For example:
The benefits of having more minority supervisors do not
justify imposing a racial classification with such a loose
connection to remedying past discrimination. Croson, 488
U.S. at 495-99; see also John Hart Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974) (" [S]pecial scrutiny in
the suspect classification context has in fact consisted not
in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the
classification in issue fit a constitutionally permissible state
goal with Freater precision than any available
alternative." ).'
Citing a general treatise's explanation of a critical concept
can have the same effect:
Plaintiff's alleged waiver of its rights after the contract was
signed cannot expand Defendant's obligations under the
contract. See Bourland v. Choctaw, 0. & G. Ry., 99 Tex.
407, 90 S.W. 483, 484 (1906) (" [T]he rights and liabilities
of the parties are fixed by the contract and the
21. Black Fire Fighters Assn. v. City of Dallas, 19 F.3d 992, 997 n. 20 (5th Cir. 1994).
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circumstances known to them when it is made, and cannot
be increased by notice of other facts subsequently given.");
28 Tex. Jur. 3d, Damages § 97, at 83-84 (1996) (" Damages
to persons not parties to the contract ordinarily cannot be
considered as the natural consequence of its breach).
This kind of citation can bolster the logic of an argument,
as well as the advocate's credibility and the overall appeal of the
argument. As with a citation to the "leading" case, citation to
policies and treatises signals the brief writer's thorough
preparation (ethos) as well as underscoring the social or moral
importance of the issue at hand (pathos).
E. Absence of Precedent
Sometimes there is no precedent to cite, and thus there is
little for advocates to rely upon other than the logical force of
their arguments, enhanced by their credibility and emotional
appeal. In 2000, Cable News Network (CNN) applied for
permission to broadcast the oral argument before the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.21 Its
brief provides an excellent example of advocacy based almost
entirely upon ethos and pathos.23 CNN relied upon three
Supreme Court cases: two dealing with the televising of criminal
trials24 and a third about the right to observe a criminal trial.25
As a matter of logic, none of these cases dealt with the
issue of how the Supreme Court should conduct its own
proceedings. The brief reasoned almost entirely from the policy
of openness involved in the cited cases, and the unique
significance of the Florida election dispute. From a citation
perspective, however, the strategy CNN followed illustrated a
wise approach to the situation in which there is little or no
controlling precedent. CNN did not try to make more of the
available cases than they fairly allowed, and it avoided citing
22. No. 00-836 (U.S. 2000). This was the first Supreme Court appeal relating to the
2000 election, before the one that ultimately led to Al Gore's concession. Bush v. Gore,
No. 00-949 (U.S. 2000).
23. Application of Cable News Network to Broadcast Oral Argument and Motion for
Expedition with Respect Thereto (Nov. 27, 2000), Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board,
No. 00-836 (U.S. 2000) (on file with author).
24. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (198 1).
25. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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marginally relevant cases simply to be citing something. In other
words, it carefully selected its citations to maximize the
credibility of its advocacy, while at the same time appealing
strongly to the emotions unique to that highly charged case.
III. CONCLUSION
Aristotle's principles remind us that even the sometimes
dry exercise of selecting supporting citation is part of the
centuries-old craft of advocacy. Logic plays a powerful role in
the choice of citation, but it is not the only criterion. Citation
choice should also consider how to enhance the credibility of the
advocate and the emotional appeal of the argument. An advocate
who considers all three of Aristotle's elements in choosing
authority and constructing citations is likely to produce briefs
with additional persuasive power.
